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The Constitutional Aspects of Home Rule 
by 
HENRY FLOYD 0 
Perhaps what we should do is trace the history of the constitutional 
concept of home rule in South Carolina and then get around to the most 
important thing: what questions we have to deal with. 
Initially, I think home rule is nothing new to South Carolina which 
might surprise some of you. In fact the constitution of 1868 contained 
a provision that was taken from the Ohio constitution that provided as 
follows: "The qualified electors of each county shall elect three persons 
for the term of two years who - shall have jurisdiction over roads, 
highways, ferries, bridges, and in all matters relating to taxes, dis-
bursement of money for county purposes and in every other case that 
may be necessary to the internal improvement and local concern to the 
respective counties." 
Now you can see that's quite a broad provision and very progressive 
and ahead of its time for 1868, and unfortunately, that provision, as I 
said being ahead of its time, became one of the focal points of the 
power struggle between the so-called carpetbaggers in the late 1800's 
and the white democrats. That struggle conswnated in a repeal of 
that particular provision in the 1890's. In fact, county government for 
all practical purposes was left out of the 1895 constitution in terms of 
how it would be constructed or what forms there would be. Now there 
are some provisions in other parts that we'll discuss later, but basically 
it was just ignored. 
The general law carryovers of the board of commissioners and the 
roads and bridges jurisdiction of county government was maintained 
in Article X, Section 6 of the constitution. As I said, the provision 
was repealed and left out of the constitution of 1895 and subsequently 
the power to run both state government and county government was 
placed in the general assembly and for some 80 odd years now it's been 
run for all practical purposes out of Columbia, which, in my own 
personal opinion is contrary to the concept of home rule and it does not 
best meet the needs of the people. This particular attitude of having 
county government run from the state house rather than the court house 
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was carefully guarded by the judiciary in interpreting a number of 
decisions in which they treated county government as an arm of state 
government. And the court house for all practical purposes, became 
merely a place of record keeping, with an occasional visitati on from 
the circuit court. There were some confrontations between local office-
holders, county auditors, etc., but the real power to run local govern-
ment was in the state house in the supply bill. 
Now South Carolina took its own good time leaving the 19th 
century. The counties were virtually ignored in the 1895 constitu tion, 
and the taxing power, which is the real power of government, was left 
with the legislature. 
The fellow that drafted Article X, Section 6 was really an un-
imaginative fellow when he drafted the so-called county purpose doc-
trine , because even that particular concept limited the individual legisla-
tor or the delegation severely in how to deal budgetarily with county 
government. You may be familiar with that provision but generally it 
provides just for the maintenance of roads and bridges , the burial of 
paupers and a few other very restricted kinds of things. The county 
government couldn 't deal in water districts or sewer systems or fire 
protection or a number of other things that have become almost neces-
sary in today 's society. To get around Article X, Section 6, some of 
our people contrived the idea of the special purpose district which 111 
address myself to in just a minute. 
But there became increasingly from 1895 a recognition by a number 
of people that this kind of government was not in the best interes t 
of the local people. And I suppose we should pay tribute to the holy 
city of Charleston and the county of Charleston because in the late 1940's 
they initiated the first County Coun cil Act. It was challenged in a 
cowt decision in 1948 and survived for all practical purposes the con-
stitutional questions with some exceptions. Any constitutional question 
that was raised by the county council act, 1948, and all those thereafter , 
I think, have been resolved by th e pa ssage of the new Article VIII. 
Now as I said just a minute ago, to get around the problems of 
Article X, Section 6, the counties began to develop a form of govern-
ment called Government By Special Purpose Districts. The countie s 
couldn't do certain things but somebody in the legislature used their 
imagin ation and decided that setting up a special purpose district within 
the county would get around the constitutional provision, and that is 
exactly what happened. Now we have some 200 or more of these par-
ticular kinds of districts in South Carolina. The special purpose district 
was a good innovation for two or three reasons. One, it showed a 
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little imagination, to overcome the constitutional provisions. Second, 
it met a specific need in -the area, for example, for fire protection 
for a particular area, or for water service or sewer service. On the 
other hand, their proliferation was something akin to rabbits, there are 
just too many of them. And the ultimate effect of special purpose 
districts was that they began to strangle not only municipal govern-
ment but county government. So we had to take a look at that in view 
of what it was doing to those bodies of government that were dually 
constituted to run local affairs, and that was one of the reasons be-
hind Article VIII. 
The break finally came in terms of getting local government back 
in the hands of the people as a result of reapportionment. The battles 
of 1960, and those that continue even today will ultimately end, I hope, 
in the reapportionment of the senate. The legislative delegation is no 
longer capable of managing local affairs, not only from a legal and 
fairness standpoint, but particularly from a time aspect because the re-
sponsibility of a legislature has become almost full-time in Columbia . 
In the late 1960' s there was developed a constitutional revision 
study committee and they proposed the now enacted Article VIII. The 
people voted on it in 1972 and belatedly the General Assembly enacted 
this particular implementing legislation in 1975. Thus there began 
constitutionally a local government renaissance which had been original-
ly born in 1868 but now reborn again in 1975. 
The court test to the new constitutional Article VIII came very quick-
ly in the case of Knight vs. Salisbury. Lronically, the object of that par-
ticular court suit was a special purpose district. These things are going 
to cause us trouble. Let me point out one of the problems. In the 
home rule bill there is talk about special purpose districts and how you 
dissolve them and how you maintain them and what you do with them. 
There is also a 197 4 act on the books that talks about the vecy same 
thing and gives a great deal of power to county governing bodies to 
expand, restrict or actually abolish special purpose districts. But there 
is a conflict in the language between how you go about doing it. So 
we have some problems there and they are going to continue to be a 
thorn in our side. 
The unfortunate thing about Knight vs. Salisbury was that the 
Supreme Court was not unanimous. The vote was something like a 
basketball defense 1-2-2, although it was a 3-2 majority. The opinion 
of the court written by Judge Littlejohn was concurred in by Justice 
Lewis and Justice Moss, but they reached their decision through a 
completely different avenue. Then you had Judge Butsey and Judge 
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Brailsford on the other hand in the dissent so that it didn't really pro-
vide us with a lot except that it scared us to death. We though t we 
better hurry up and get this act passed. So it took about two years 
for us to get around to doing that. 
During the debate on home rule the latter part of this year, came 
the Horry County decision. It involves several questions . One is the 
constitutionality of the supply bill, based on the fact th at the Horry 
delegation was partly composed of people outside Horry County. One 
member lived in Georgetown County and that was a result of the <re-
apportionment problem again. Judge Larson issued a very detailed order 
in which he struck down the supply bill, but by the time it got to the 
Supreme Court they decided not to rule on the point because it was 
already moot. So we don't have any real clear cut decisions to this 
date on the question of suppl y bills. Judge Morrison's order is still in 
effect. The Supreme Court did not :reverse that decision, they just 
chose not to hear it. 
Now that's the history. I would like to change gears and prop ose 
several questions fm you. A lot of it is going to need litigation. Some 
of it is going to need corrective litigation, and some of it's just 
going to need a good election next year to clear it up, but the questi ons 
are going to be the same. 
First of all, what did Amcle VIII do to the 1895 constitution? It 
repealed old Article VII which was an article dealing with county gov-
ernment ( specifically with the merger and consolidation and disillusion 
of counties). By constitutional interpretation, I think the latter will of 
the people overrides the first , but nevertheless it is still there and 
it could cause some problems in terms of some of the provisions that 
are in there . For example, the eight mile courthouse limit is still on 
tl1e book. So what happens as a result of that? I don't know. 
What do we do about the general law already on the books dealing 
with the merger of counties , when it says in Article VIII that the General 
Assembly shall provide, and we haven't? Under the preliminary power 
of the legislature, probably that general law is still good, but there is 
a question about that. In repealing old Article VIII here is a very interes t-
ing question for the municipal people . In Section 7 of old Article VIII 
there was an 8% debt ceiling limitation. That same limitation can be 
found in Amcle X, Section 5. But the Knight vs. Salisbury case and 
other cases, in terms of constructing constitution, says that any old 
Article must be harmonized and construed in light of the last will of 
the people - which is new Article VIII. Now does that mean that the 
8% debt limitation does not apply to municipalities, notwithstandin g 
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that the provision is still in the constitution in Artcle X? So there's 
a constitutional problem. And that's a serious problem in terms of the 
impact of the financial structure of municipalities in particular. The 
county provision is still in Article X. 
Another question. What do you do about Article III, Section 34 and 
its impact on Article VIII? That particular section is the local act, or 
special act, prohibition. The general assembly and the courts have 
winked at this thing from time immemorial. That is the way we run 
things, by local act. There are a number of laws on the books that 
are nothing but special acts and local acts and in my opinion uncon-
stitutional and subject to challenge. This is going to be one of the 
critical problems in the future. The Supreme Court is going to have 
to come down very clearly and very hard on the question of local acts . 
What are the provisions that are in the actual bill? Everywhere that 
it says "the General Assembly shall provide for" somet):ring that can 
reasonably be interpreted to be a power of the local governing bodies, 
there is a constitutional cloud. For example, in selecting the terms of 
office, 2 or 4 years (both in the county provision), to actually draw the 
district lines if you choose to go the single member districts, to select 
the number of members on the council, all this is provided in "the 
General Assembly shall provide for this." Thank goodness the petition 
method is in there so that if the will of the people is abrogated by 
action of legislative members, then they can overcome that. But all 
those things raise constitutional questions and we argued about it and 
argued about it in the General Assembly, but we still passed it anyway. 
Now what about some other constitutional questions that need to 
be considered? Article V provides for a uniform judicial system. Yet 
the legislature provided for municipal courts in the implementing legis-
lation to Article VIII. So we've got a problem there. 
One of the big questions for municipal people is the question of 
annexation. Municipalities wanted to maintain the right to choose the 
electric supplier in their area in case of annexation. The private power 
companies agreed because they have control over most of the municipal 
areas. The cooperatives, on the other hand, said no, we want to main-
tain the areas that have been assigned to us by the public service com-
mission. There is a serious questji.on of annexation in terms of the 
franchising rights of municipalities. And apparently it will have to be 
litigated. We have spent two yea•rs trying to argue this thing out 
and iron it out in conference committees and could not. There is a 
division between the house and the senate over that matter. And so 
apparently it will have to be litigated. How far does municipal franchise 
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right go in light of Article VIII? Some say it goes all the way. Oth ers say 
that provisions have taken exception to that. Others say th at the 
General Assembly can provide for conditions and requirements of an-
nexation, and so therefore can decide who's going to serve in the area. 
And as I said, that's a big problem. 
The last thing I think I would like to address myself to is education. 
We have a lot of talk about education. What effect does home rule 
have on education? Now we can argue about this but in my opinion 
if you'll read Article XI, Section 3, it says the General Assembly shall 
provide for a three system public education. That is a newly enacted 
provision in the constitution. I take that to mean that the General 
Assembly will provide for the educational system in this stat e and it 
has nothing to do with home rule. But school board people hav e gone 
out and advocated, we want home rule too. Maybe they ought to 
have it, but it doesn't belong in Aiticle VIII. It doesn't belong in this 
implementing legislation. In my personal opinion it is subject to Ar-
ticle XI, Section 3 and if the General Assembly decides that home rule 
for school districts is in their best interests then that's the way it 
ought to be. But its not a part of this discussion - there is no mention 
of education in Article VIII, it is in Article XI. 
Finally, on the question of the constitutional aspects, there are two 
articles that greatly affect home rule that are still outstanding, but have 
not been submitted to the people. One is Article III, the legislative 
article, and the other is Ai-tide X which is the finance article. If we 
give you all these powers and we don't give you the financial where-
withall to do it , and at the same time provide safe-guards ( make sure 
that the state's credit is not damaged) then we're going to have a 
serious problem. Article X is old and it needs to be looked at not 
only in terms of protecting the people from municipal and county 
governments who choose not to balance their budgets and spend un-
wisely, but also in terms of providing local governments with the 
ability to meet those needs that are demanded by the people . 
